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SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS:
A BASIS OF THE STATE POLICE POWER
ELMER E. SMEAD
At the basis of the police power, reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, is the common law
maxim enjoining one to use his property in such a way as not to in-
jure that of another. It is the purpose of this paper to study the mean-
ing and scope of this maxim from its origin through its use in Ameri-
can Constitutional Law by the United States Supreme Court in order
to show its significance as an instrument for the interpretation of the
United States Constitution.
The principle that one should use his own property in such a way
that he does not injure that of another is to be found early in the
common law. Glanvil,1 Bracton,2 Fleta, and Britton4 devote some
space to its discussion, recording the rules of law based upon the
principle and the instances in which the common law limited a man's
use of his own property. In several places, the principle is recognized
specifically. Bracton,5 speaking of servitudes, says, "And in the same
manner it is sometimes imposed by right, and neither by man's
appointment nor by use, to wit, that no one may do in his own estate
anything whereby damage or nuisance may happen to his neighbour."
Britton,6 apropos of the same subject, says, "Sometimes the soil is
subject to a servitude by law, although not by any man's appoint-
ment, or by the establishment of peaceable seisin, as for example, to
the obligation that no one shall do anything in his own soil that may
be a grievance or annoyance to his neighbours." The principle is
generally implied in the discussion of the specific uses of property
which the law had held to be illegal because the results were stamped
as injurious to another's property. "Nuisance" was a common word
IGLANVIL, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS REGNI ANGLIAE (II87-ii89) b.
13, C. 32-39; Beale's edition of Beame's translation, pp. 270-277.
2BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE (1250) b. 4, c. 37, f.
221, 221b; b. 4, c. 42-47, f. 23Ib-23 5b- edition by Sir Travers Twiss, Vol. 3, PP.
472-481, 552-593.
8FLETA, COMMENTAPIUS JuRis ANGLICANI, b. 4, c. 18.
4BRiT-oN (129X-1292) b. 2, C. 23, 30-32; edition by Francis Morgan Nichols,
Vol. I, pp. 359-371, 397-416.
5BRACTON, op. cit. supra note 2, b. 4, c. 37, fL 221; 3 Twiss, op. cit. supra note 2,
477. /
6BR1TTON, op. cit. supra note 4, b. 2, C. 23, see. 5, f. x4 ob; I NiCHOLS, op. ci.
supra note 4, 362. See also Fleta, loc. cit. supra note 3.
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in the law of this period, and in a great number of instances it decided
what a nuisance was.7
Nevertheless, it is clear that the maxim itself was unknown in this
early period. It came as a contribution of the later sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries and was merely the application of a
Latin expression to the principle itself, which had had centuries of
acceptance and use behind it. The Latin form served to give this
principle greater authority and presented to the judiciary a con-
venient expression for it, which probably accounts for the acceptance
and general use of the maxim thereafter.
In the thirty-seventh year of Elizabeth, Godfrey, in arguing for
the plaintiff in Edward's Case,8 contended that the defendant was
liable for his acts even though he had not intended to injure the
plaintiff's property "for the rule is sic were tuo ut alienum won laedas."9
In this case the plantiff had leased the cellar of a building and the
defendant had leased the first floor. On his floor, the defendant stored
goods of less weight than that permitted by his lease, but the floor
fell with injury to the plaintiff's goods in the cellar. The maxim does
not appear in the decision, but this is to be expected since the judg-
ment for the plaintiff was given on the pleadings. On writ of error, the
Exchequer Chamber 0 affirmed the judgment and supported God-
frey's argument, although it does not mention the maxim. The court
held that even if the defendant had not used his floor to the extent
permitted in his lease he should not have placed more weight on the
floor than it would support so that another person's property might
not be damaged thereby. The idea was that the defendant has used
his property, that the plaintiff's property was injured as a result of
this use and that, therefore, the defendant was liable.
In Aldred's Case" in the eighth year of James I the plaintiff brought
an action on the case against the defendant for building a pig-sty on
his land close to the plaintiff's house. Coke, in reporting Chief Justice
Wray's decision that the plaintiff recover, said that if a man has a
lime-kiln so near the house of his neighbor that the smoke enters the
7The Year Books show the same implication of the principle. There are many
complaints that another has been using his property injuriously, as that the de-
fendant has acted to the nuisance, damage or injury of the plantiff's tenement or
estate. The remedy granted was usually an order that the nuisance be abated and
the property restored to its original condition. See, for example, Fulk v. John de
Burgate, Pleas in Eyre, 4 King John, 3 SELD. Soc. 95 (1202); Note, Horwood, Y.
B. 20 & 21 Edw. I, 418 (1293); Note, Horwood, Y. B. 32 & 33 Edw. , 330 (1304);
Crakehall Case, Y. B. 6 Edw. 11, 36 SELD. Soc. 76 (1313).
8Edwards v. Halinder, 2 Leon. 93 (1594).
91bid.
'"Pop. 46 (1594). u9 Co. 57 (16xx).
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house, or if a glover corrupts the water running to another's house, an
action on the case would lie, "and this stands with the rule of law and
reason, se. Prohibetur ne quis faciat in suo quod nocere possit alieno;
et sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas."12 This seems to be the only time
this maxim was used by Coke. It does not appear in his Institutes,
although he does speak of nuisances and although he does discuss
those uses of one's property which were forbidden by the law as being
injurious to another's property and for which the law gave a remedy.
In one place, 3 the principle is stated as it applied to the construction
of buildings. In that case, he said that the common law prohibited
the erection of any building on a man's land involving some nuisance
or prejudice to any other man "in his house." "Aedificare in tuo
proprio solo non licit, quod alteri noceat,"'14 is the Latin expression
which he used in that situation.
In these two cases, the maxim is used familiarly as if it were well
established, well known, frequently used, and not subject to doubt.
It was not the creation of something new but rather the application
of a Latin expression to a principle long established and applied in
the English common law. Moreover, it was characteristic of Coke
to give a Latin name to an old idea and thus to give it the appearance
of authority. 5 It is also to be expected of this period in the develop-
ment of the law, a period whose philosophy held that the essence of
truth was to be found in mathematics-which meant at that time
complete dependence on axioms which were considered as ultimate
and self-demonstrable truths. In the attempt to make of the law a
scientific subject, it "was being provided with another maxim-or
axiom. 6 Furthermore, this period of English history shows the exis-
tence of a stable society with rights and duties established and with
the relations between individuals undergoing no great changes.
But the way in which the maxim was used certainly points to some
prior authority for it, and it is probably true that Coke was not
creating out of the whole cloth. He undoubtedly had received a hint




3 Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause
(1930)29 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 7.
16See DIcKINON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF THE LAW
(1927) 115: "It was believed that the one and only legal rule for every possible
situation could be written off in advance by a proper combination of axiomatic
first principles with the same accuracy as the answers to all the problems in the
Euclidean geometry. Law ceased to be an instrument for working toward cer-
tainty-it became certainty itself." See also Id. 115, n. I5; 125, n. 29. For the
attitude toward maxims see DOCTOR AND STUDENT, Dial. I, Chap. 8; Co. LITT.
IO, I1, 67, 87, 343; LITT. §§12o, 385; 2 INST. 210; PLOWD. 27b; I BL. COMM. 68.
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from Bracton's De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae.17 As is well
known, this work was the accepted authority in Coke's day and he
was well acquainted with it. Bracton, in turn, was commenting on the
Corpus Juris Civilis of the Roman Law and in doing so served to carry
o er into the common law the statement "Juris praecepta sunt hoc:
honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere."'8 Thus we
find that the statement of the Roman Law that one should not harm
or injure another was taken over by Bracton, where it was noticed by
Coke who combined it with the already accepted principle of the
common law that one should use his own property in such a way as
not to injure another's property and who consequently created the
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.
This maxim was considered as a fundamental and unquestionable
rule of law which was to be accepted and applied by the courts
without question. And in fact, it was not criticised or attacked at any
time during this early period of its development. This was because
the judges thought they were applying a principle of justice which
came from the natural or higher law and which was, therefore, a
binding rule of the common law. They believed that they were apply-
ing a rule of right and of reason. This conception of the nature of the
maxim and of the principle for which it stands is shown by the fact
17BRACTON, op. cit. supra note 2, b. I, c. 4, f. 2b; I Twiss, op. cit. supra note 2,
14; 8 SELD. Soc. 23. "De hoc autem quod dicit 'cuique', id est sibi ipsi, ut honeste
vivat; item Deo, ut Deum diligat; item proximo, ut eum non laedat." See also Azo of
Bologna, 8 SELD. SOC. 24, "Vel dic cuigue, id est Sibi, ut honete Vivat, et deo, ut deum
diligat, et proximo, ut eum non laedat." Professor Maitland says in his introduction,
p. IX of 8 SELD. Soc. that Bracton probably depended upon Azo of Bologna for
much of the Romanesque material. Thus, the former probably took this passage
from the latter, who in turn had found it in the CORPUS JuRIs.
lCORPUS JURIS CIVILIS, INST. I, I, 3. This passage is attributed to Ulpian in
the DIGEST, I, I, I0, . It is significant to note here that the pronoun alterum as
used here becomes transferred into the adjective alienum in the maxim. This gives
grammatical support to the position taken in this paper to the effect that the
maxim was directed at the protection of property rights rather than to all rights
of person, and thus it is not the basis of the law of torts as some authors have
held. See infra.
This quotation from the Roman Law "is not a rule of law. It rather expresses
the ideal which the law seeks to attain, the reasons of policy that led the law-
making powers to ordain that men should pay their debts, should not commit
various fraudulent acts, or should abstain from certain kinds of violence against
their neighbors." TERRY, SOME LEADING PRINCIPLES OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
(1884) §i. See also MAx RADIN, ROMAN LAW (1927) 86.
"Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. So far as I know this maxim does not occur
among the sources of Roman law, but it expresses the general principle of the
law." McILWAiN, THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST (1932) 161,
n. I.
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that Bracton9 said that the principle was imposed by right (jure) and
that Britton0 placed its origin in the natural law (dreit). Coke in
Aldred's Case, laid the maxim down as "a rule of reason" and Black-
stone described it as the enforcement of "that excellent rule of gospel-
morality, of 'doing to others, as we would they should do unto our-
selves.' "21 Also, where there was no express indication that the princi-
ple was considered as one coming from the natural law, this origin
was implied in the unquestioned acceptance and use of it.
Once the maxim was born it was taken up by the courts and ap-
plied with gradually increasing frequency. By the time of Black-
stone (1756) we find it well known and in full use. In fact, he uses it
extensively and mentions it in several places in his Commentaries.2
Furthermore, he gives in illustration of it many situations which are
the same as those to be found in the cases decided for centuries before
Aldred's Case but which cases do not in fact use the maxim. In other
words, according to Blackstone, the maxim forbade certain uses of
property which the cases had already declared to be illegal because
injurious to the property of another in that period of the common law
prior to the origin of the maxim itself.2 This supports the conclusion
presented above: that the maxim is a mere form of Latin words, a
hint of which Coke had received from the civil law though Bracton,
applied to a body of law and decided cases which had been in existence
for centuries before the birth of the maxim itself-a form of words
coined under the influence of the idea that the rules for which the
maxim stood were of such a degree of validity that they could not be
doubted and consequently partook of the nature of the rules of reason
and right, incorporated into the legal system as part of the "Higher
Law."
Once established in the common law, primarily on Coke's authority,
the maxim operated to protect real property from what the courts
thought were injuries resulting from the use by another of his real
property. Thus the maxim came to mean "So use your own real
property in order that you do not injure the real property of another,"
and this was the only meaning it had at the common law in this early
period when the rights of property were paramount. It did not apply
to the law of torts in general or to the law of negligence, with the
defense of contributory negligence, and attempts to define it in this
broad manner are unsupported by the cases.
The maxim, prior to its adoption by the United States Supreme
19See supra note 5. 20See supra note 6.
213 BL. COMM. 218. See also DOCTOR AND STUDENT, supra note 16.
2 I3L. Comm. 306; 3 Id. 217. 233 Id. at 216-218.
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Court, was used in the common law to apply to the use by riparian
owners of the water flowing by their land; to the use of one's prop-
erty for purposes which caused a nuisance to adjoining property
owners by generating bad odors or smoke, 5 by shutting off ancient
lights,26 and by diverting rain water;27 and to the use of land in such
a way as to deprive adjoining land of its natural support. 8 During
the later eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, the maxim was
applied outside the field of real property law, but only in two cases.
In Bush v. Steinmani9 the maxim was used where the plaintiff had
received a personal injury, and in The King v. Ward" where the
defendant was charged with blocking the King's highway and con-
sequently with having injured the general rights of the public rather
than the real property rights of another person. These two cases are
interpreted by the author as showing the tendency of the common law
courts to expand the meaning of the maxim in later years and as
pointing the way for further expansion by the United States Supreme
24Aldred's Case, 9 Co. 57, 59 (1611); 3 BL. CoMM. 218; 3 KENT, COMM. 439;
Story, J., in Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 401,402 (1829); BROOM, LEGAL MAXIsS
(1845) 163. See also Anonymous, Dyer, 248b (1564); Penruddock's Case, 5 Co.
Iloa (1598); Luttrell's Case, 4 Co. 84 (16oi); COMYN, DIGEST, Action on the Case
for a nuisance (A, C); BACON, ABRIDGEMENT, Actions on the Case (A, F); VINER,
ABRIDGEMENT, Actions for Nuisances, (N. b) 12, 13; Leach, J., in Wright v. How-
ard, I Sim. & Stu. 190, 203, (1823). In Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324 (1843)
in argument, 331-341, the maxim is used, but Tindal, C. J., at p. 348, 349 held
the rule as to surface streams did not apply to underground water.
See the maxim Aqua currit et debet currere ut currere solebat, 3 KENT, COMM. 439.25Aldred's Case, 9 Co. 57, 58 (1611); Morley v. Pragnel, Cro. Car. 51o (1639);
the maxim here used is sic uti suo, quod alienum non laedat. Jones v. Powell, Hutt.
135 (1664); 3 BL. CoMM. 217.
26Wray, C. J., in Bland v. Moseley (1587) cited in Aldred's Case, 9 Co. 57, 58
(1611); Ryppon v. Bowles, Cro. Jac. 373 (1615); Symonds v. Seabourne, Cro.
Car. 325 (1634); Cox v. Matthews, 3 Keb. 133 (1684-1685); Anonymous, I Vent.
248 (1685); Villers v. Ball, I Show. 7 (169o); Rosewell v. Pryor, I Ld. Raym. 392
(1699); 2 BL. CoMM. 402, and note by Chitty; 3 BL. CoM. 216, 217; Read v.
Brookman, 3 T. R. 151 (1789); Daniel v. North, ii East, 372 (18o9); Chandler v.
Thompson, 3 Camp. N. P. 80 (1811); Cross v. Lewis, 2 B. & C. 686 (1824).
It is here that the maxim comes into conflict with the maxim cuius est solum
eius est usgue ad coelum.
27Carpenter v. Tilloy, Y. B. 3 Edw. II, 22 SELD. SOC. 12 (I31O); Anonymous,
Horwood, Y. B. II & 12 Edw. III, 468 (1338); Anonymous, Pike, Y. B. 18 Edw.
III, 210 (r344); Penruddock's Case, 5 Co. 101 (1598); Reynolds v. Clark, Fort.
212 (1724); 3 BL. COMM. 216.
"Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739,744 (185o); Bonomi v. Blackhouse, El. B.
& El. 622, 637, 640 (1858). See also argument by Spankie, Serjt., in The Grocers'
Co. v. Donne, 3 Bing. N. C. 34, 41 (1836); Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220,
224(1815).29iB. & P. 404, 407 (1799). 304 A. & E. 384, 406 (1836).
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Court. Thus that court was furnished with precedent for applying
the maxim to new situations in the private law and for extending it
to the public law, which the court did by holding that the maxim
was at the basis of the police power reserved to the states in the
Tenth Amendment.
The common law, however, also restricted the scope of the maxim
during this later period, and it was probably this trend which was
the strongest in the development of the maxim by the English courts
before it was adopted in American Constitutional Law. This restric-
tion was effected in two ways. One was to narrow its applicability
to the cases arising before the courts through use of a rule of reason
which served to permit the courts to hold that what had previously
been held to be injurious uses of property were no longer injurious.
The doctrine of reasonableness was injected into the right of use of
water by riparian owners,3 into the right of a land owner to make
noise and create bad odors which affected his neighbor, 2 and into
the right to obstruct the ancient lights of the buildings on adjoining
property.3 The second way in which the maxim was restricted was
by the decline or disappearance of the older uses of property. As a
result of changing economic conditions, property was being used in
new and different ways, with the result that the cases coming before
the courts involved new questions. The older cases no longer being
brought before the courts, the maxim was no longer applied to the
particular uses of property which had been involved in such cases.
Probably the most important cause for these changes in the mean-
3 1Wright v. Howard, I Sim. & Stu. 190, 203 (1823); Williams v. Morland, 2 B.
& C. 9io, 915, 916 (1824); Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason 397, 401, 402 (Circuit Ct.
U. S. 1827).
"Brand v. Hammersmith & City Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 246, 247 (1867). Here
the plaintiff was denied recovery in his suit for damages caused to his dwelling
from noise, smoke, and vibration resulting from defendant's operation of its rail-
road. Erle, C. J., laid down the rule that action lay only where there is an excess of
damage beyond what is reasonable. Proximity of people necessarily causes some
annoyance and requires forbearance on the part of all. The degree of forbearance
"is measured by the sensibility to feelings of delicacy of the tribunal which has to
decide the case, and cannot be foreseen till that decision is given. The maxim
'sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,' is no help to decision, as it cannot be applied
till the decision is made ...."
33Back v. Stacy, 2 C. & P. 465, 466 (1826). It is not enough that the plaintiff
has less light in fact. Before he has a cause of action "there must be a substantial
privation of light, sufficient to render the occupation of the house uncomfortable
and to prevent the plaintiff from carrying on his accustomed business on the
premises as beneficially as he had formerly done .... The jury must distinguish
between a partial inconvenience and a real injury to the plaintiff in the enjoyment
of the premises."
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ing given to the maxim by the common law courts was the developing
economic system. Along with urban growth and the onslaught of
the commercial and industrial revolutions, property was being used in
different ways. New situations began to arise and the older situations
began to disappear or, at least, to appear with less frequency in the
cases which came before the courts. Furthermore, with the philosophy
of laissez-faire which accompanied the new economic system, the
courts were inclined to lean toward the maxim that one could use his
property as he pleased, and thus to be more reluctant to hold that the
effects were injurious. In view of this tendency to restrict the maxim
and the reasons accounting for it, it is extremely interesting and
significant to note that the United States Supreme Court brought
about a great expansion.
This period very clearly brings out the character of the maxim.
While the courts treated it as a rule of law, in reality it was not one.
The cases clearly indicate that the use of property was injurious be-
cause it interfered with the rights of another and thus was forbidden
by the law. It was the function of the courts to decide whether the
defendant had been using his property injuriously and the maxim
was no aid to the decision of that question. To apply the maxim was
superfluous because it was not necessary to the decision of the case.
Consequently, regardless of the attitude of the courts toward it, it
must be considered as a principle or goal toward which the law was
striving, and the courts, in the attempt to approximate it, were lay-
ing down rules of law which in themselves decided the cases. As the
cases held certain new uses of property to be forbidden by the maxim,
new rules of law were made and this meant that the interpretation of
the maxim likewise was changed.
The United States Supreme Court has accepted its inheritance
with reverence and respect, asserting that the maxim is a funda-
mental rule of justice and right.Y In no case in which the maxim is
used has that court criticised it, 31 but in its use many changes have
been made in its meaning, thus contributing to the story of its de-
velopment. While accepting the Latin form, the court gave it new
content.
In the field of private law the United States Supreme Court carried
further the limited expansion of the maxim as previously begun by
the English courts in the case of Bsish v. Steinman. Thus, while the
34Field, J., in Baltimore and Potomac R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, io8 U. S.
317, 331 (1883).
nAmerican Bell Telephone Co. v. U. S., 68 Fed. 542, 563 (I895) contains a
criticism of the maxim.
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maxim was used in its original meaning in cases of nuisances by smoke
and noise 8 and of pollution or diversion of water, 7 it was also ex-
panded in order to apply it to cases of the use of movable property
which injured the plaintiff's movable property3 8 or his real property, 3
and to the use'of movable property in such a way as to cause personal
injuries.40 No longer was the maxim being limited to the use of real
property or to injuries to real property.
The trend already begun by King v. Ward was carried still further
by Mr. Justice Pitney in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell."' In
this case, the defendants were restrained from securing the promises
of the employees of the plaintiff to join a union on the grounds that
to do so was an interference with the contract between the employees
and the plaintiff which provided that if the employees did join a
union their employment would terminate. In the course of his opinion,
Mr. Justice Pitney said that while there is a right to form unions
and to enlarge the memberships of unions by inviting employees to
join, nevertheless that right was not absolute. Like other rights it
must be exercised with respect for the rights of others, and the maxim
forbade this conflict of rights. He admitted that this maxim literally
applied only to property rights but asserted that it should more prop-
erly apply to "conflicting rights of every description."4' The defen-
dants, he held, were injuring the plaintiff and its employees.
In this case, the maxim was used even though the defendants were
not using their property, real or personal, and even though the results
of their actions, which the court thought were injurious, did not
8Baltimore and Potomac R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, supra note 34; U. S.
v. Luce, 141 Fed. 385 (go5). See also LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. Paul
Ry. Co., 232 U. S. 340, 349, 350 (1913).
37Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 230 U. S. 46 (1912); Exley v. Southern Cot-
ton Oil Co., 151 Fed. IOI (1907). See argument in Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S.
125, 146 (I90I).
See the maxim, agua currit ef debet currere ut currere solebat, 3 KENT, COMM.
439; Atchison v. Peterson, 20 Wall. 507 (1874); U. S. v. Rio Grande Dam &
Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 69o (1899).
See also U. S. v. Bostwick, 94 U. S. 53, 66 (1876) where Chief justice Waite
held that the maxim was to be implied in every lease and to be treated as binding
on the lessee just as if the maxim were an express part of the contract. This also
is an interesting use of the maxim for which there is no precedent.
38The Marianna Flora, I I Wheat. I, 42 (1826). Story, J., also wrote the opinion
in the Cijcuit Court, 3 Mason I16, 119 (1822). See also The China, 7 Wall. 53,
68 (1868); The Syracuse, 9 Wall. 672, 676 (1869).
39Dutton v. Strong, I Bl. 22, 33, 34 (1861).
40Hayes v. Mich. Cent. R. R. Co., III U. S. 228 (1884). See also Delaware,
Lackawanna &WesternR. v. Converse, 139 U. S. 469 (189o).
"245 U. S. 229 (1917). 421d. at 253, 254, 255.
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affect any real property of the plaintiff. This is indeed an expansion
of the maxim to its ultimate limits, and, except for the one case, has
no support in the English common law which limited the maxim to
the use of property. It is true that Broom contended that the maxim
applied in this broader sense and Mr. Justice Pitney relied on
Broom. 43 But this construction was solely Broom's own as shown by
the fact that the cases he cited do not in this respect make any use
of the maxim. In his preface, Broom says that he has preferred those
cases where the maxim has been cited or directly stated to apply,
but that he has found it "necessary to refer to many other instances
in which no such specific reference has been made, but which seem
clearly to fall within the principle of the Rule; and wherever this has
been done, sufficient authorities have, it is hoped, been appended to
enable the reader, without very laborious research, to decide for him-
self whether the application suggested has been correctly made or
not."" In other words, he admits that this interpretation of the maxim
which is not directly supported by the use made of it by the English
courts, is his own. This case shows clearly the changing meaning given
to the maxim by the United States Supreme Court.
Citing his own opinion in the Hitchman case as authority, Mr.
Justice Pitney used this same interpretation in International News
Service v. Associated Press.45 But the application of the maxim, apart
from the general statements of the opinion, is more limited by the
holding that news is quasi-property as between the parties. Thus the
injunction, restraining, on the basis of the maxim, the International
News Service from pirating the news of the Associated Press until
the news had lost its commercial value, is not applied to rights which
the court thought were other than property rights.
While the Supreme Court of the United States has made this
extended use of this common law maxim, these cases do not mark
the limit of the court's reliance upon it. Perhaps the greatest Ameri-
can contribution to the development of this maxim is in continuing
the extension of it from the private law field into that of the public
law. This occurs when the maxim is relied upon in the interpretation
and justification of the police power. The court continues the trend
of King v. Ward by construing the maxim as protecting the general
rights of the public rather than the property rights of the individual.
In a number of cases, the court has sustained ordinances or statutes
on the ground that they were valid police measures because they for-
4Id. at 254. See also American Bell Telephone Co. v. U. S., supra note 35, at
563.
"BRoom, LEGAL MAxr s (1845) Preface, iv.
4s248 U. S. 215, 235, 241 (1918).
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bade or regulated the use of property in such a way as to prevent
what the court thought would be an injury to others. In those cases
where the court used the maxim, the police power was held to be the
means of giving efficacy to the maxim. In some of these cases property
was being used in ways which the common law had forbidden, and in
these cases there is a closer reliance on the historical and technical
meaning of the maxim. In others, however, the court is giving the
maxim a more general, non-historical meaning by determining that
it forbids the use of property in any way which would cause what
the court considers an injury to the public. While this is a broad
extension of the meaning of the maxim, it is merely carrying further
the American trend of using the maxim in cases in which the common
law never, or very rarely and limitedly, considered it applicable. The
maxim undoubtedly aids the decision of the court by calling to its
support, usually dogmatically by mere assertion, a Latin phrase of
considerable age, generally accepted as irrefutable. It is submitted
that the court in these cases is making into a rule of law what might
be called the-ethical content of the maxim, rather than adhering to
the limited legal significance which had been determined by the
common law.
Thus in Holyoke Company v. Lyman,46 a statute of Massachusetts
was sustained requiring fishways to be constructed in dams. A riparian
owner could not use his property rights over the water in such a way
as to injure all other proprietors up and down the stream by prevent-
ing the passage of fish. In the Slaughter House Cases,47 a statute
creating a monopoly in slaughtering, which was to be done within a
restricted area outside New Orleans, and requiring inspection was
sustained. The court agreed s that unrestricted slaughtering within
the populous sections of the city was injurious to the public and that
the legislature could forbid it in such places for the sanitary protec-
tion of the community. Private interests were declared by Mr. Justice
Miller to be subservient to the general interests of the community
and slaughtering could be forbidden on the principle that one should
use his property so as not to injure his neighbors. In Munn v. Illinois,49
Chief Justice Waite viewed the public as having certain rights in
those businesses which had legally been declared to be "vested with
a public interest," which rights were violated by excessive rates
charged by such businesses. Consequently, the legislature could set
4115 Wall. 500 (1872). 47I6 Wall. 36 (1872).
48The dissenting opinions object to the monopolistic features of the statute and
not to its police regulations.
4994 U. S. 113 (1876).
SIC UTERE TUO
rates in the protection of these public rights because no one could use
his property in such awayas to injure others. InRichmond, Fredericks-
burg & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Richmond,50 it was held that the city
under its police power could prohibit the use of locomotives in the
streets because of the danger to the public. In Fertilizing Company
v. Hyde Park,5 Mr. Justice Swayne approved the decision of the
Supreme Court of Illinois that the transportation of garbage and
offal through the town was a nuisance to the public which the town
could prohibit by ordinance because the maxim, on which the police
power rested, forbade anyone to create a public nuisance. In Crowleyv.
Christensen62 an ordinance of San Francisco was sustained requiring
a license for the sale of intoxicating liquor and forbidding the sale
without a license. One may use his property as he pleases so long as he
does not "impair the equal enjoyment by others of their property,"
and the retailing of intoxicating liquor is "attended with danger to
the community." 3 In Saint Louis & San Francisco Railroad v.
Matthews," the court sustained a statute making railroads in the
state, as insurers, responsible for the property of any person injured
or destroyed by fire started by its locomotives. In Holden v. Hardy,"
an Act of the state of Utah which set an eight-hour day for labor in
underground mines, smelters and ore reduction works was sustained
as a protection of the public. For an employer in such occupations to
require longer hours of labor was viewed as injurious to the rights of
the community. In Atlantic Coastline Railroad v. Goldsboro,56 an ordi-
nance of the town regulated the use by the railroad of its right of way
through the streets by limiting the speed of cars, setting times of the
day for shifting cars from track to track, forbidding the standing of
cars in the streets, and requiring the tracks to be lowered and the
space between the rails to be filled in. In holding this act to be valid,
Mr. Justice Pitney said that, under such circumstances as these
where the operation of the railroad was fraught with danger to the
public, "the State, in the exercise of its police power, may legitimately
extend the application of the principle that underlies the maxim
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, so far as may be requisite for the
protection of the public. ' 57 In Chicago &' Alton Railroad v. Tranbar-
ger, 8 the court sustained an Act of Missouri requiring railroads to
construct drainage systems to carry off the water which otherwise
would have collected, because the statute was a prevention of damage
5096 U. S. 521 (1877).
5'97 U. S. 659 (1878). 52137 U. S. 86 (189o).
raId. at 9o, 91. "165 U. S. 1 (1896).
"169 U. S. 366 (x897). 5'232 U. S. 548 (1913).
5 Id. at 557. 5238 U. S. 67 (1914).
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which would have been caused by the construction of the road bed,
and thus an application of the maxim. The case of The Prudential
Insurance Company v. Cheek, 9 again shows clearly this extended use
of the maxim. An Act of Missouri was sustained requiring an employer
to give an employee, upon request when the employment is ended,
a letter stating the nature and character of the service rendered, the
duration of the service and the truth as to the cause for its termina-
tion. Mr. Justice Pitney said that the state Supreme Court sustained
the Act as an exercise of the police power, "but in truth it requires no
extraordinary aid, being but a regulation of corporations calling for
an application of the familiar precept, 'sic utere tuo', etc., in a matter
of general public concern." 0
The court in these cases, however, was not creating a completely
new meaning for the maxim without prior authority. Several of the
cases give us some interesting suggestions as to the possible origin of
this use and interpretation. In one, Chancellor Kent is mentioned by
Mr. Justice Miller.6' Kent held that the government "may, by general
regulations, interdict such uses of property as would create nuisance,
and become dangerous to the lives, or health, or peace, or comfort of
the citizens... on the general and rational principle that every person
ought so to use his property as not to injure his neighbors, and that
private interests must be made subservient to the general interests of
the community." 2 Mr. Justice Swayne cited Coates v. The Mayor of
New York,63 in support of his use of the maxim in Fertilizing Company
v. Hyde Park.6 In that case the Supreme Court of New York held
valid an ordinance of the city forbidding cemeteries int certain sec-
tions of the city, saying, "Every right, from an absolute ownership in
property, down to a mere easement, is purchased and holden subject
to the restriction, that it shall be so exercised as not to injure others."6 5
Another authority more frequently cited66 is Chief Justice Shaw 7 who
sustained a statute of Massachusetts fixing a limit in the harbor of
Boston beyond which piers, wharves or other permanent structures
could not be erected. After explaining that all property rights are
subject to reasonable regulations which prevent the exercise of them
from being injurious, he gives examples of such uses. The owner is
restrained because these uses of his property are contrary to the
"9259 U. S 530 (1922). OMfd. at 544.
61Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 62 (1872).
622 KENT, Comm. 340. '7 Cow. 585 (N. Y. 1827).
497 U. S. 659, 668 (1878). '7 Cow. 585, 605 (N. Y. x827).
6St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U. S, 1, 23 (1896); Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 392 (1897).
67Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 84, 85, 86 (Mass. 18p1).
SIC UTERE TUO
maxim.6 8 These authorities pointed the way for the United States Su-
preme Court, and it was but a step for that court to adopt this new
interpretation of the maxim to its own purposes. 69
This use of the maxim in connection with the police power fur-
nishes some very interesting speculation on the attitude of the United
States Supreme Court toward that very important concept of -Con-
stitutional Law. If the police power is to be interpreted as the power
to regulate men and things or the power to protect the public health,
safety, morals and the general welfare, it is obvious that the meaning
of the maxim, if it is to be used in support of this power at all, must
be expanded by interpretation. This is exactly what has happened and
because of the nature of the maxim the expansion was very easily
brought about.
The court has used the maxim as an instrument for support of the
police power. 'Thus in no case where state Acts were declared invalid
as improper exercises of the police power, was the maxim used as a
means of so holding; i. e. in no case were such measures held void as
being violations of this common law maxim. Also, the court frequently
declared that the maxim is at the basis of the police power and that
this power of the states exists to give effect to the maxim. In the
Slaughter House Cases, for example, the attitude of the court was one
of explaining to the defeated parties that slaughter houses in populous
sections had long been considered nuisances, that they should not
have expected a statute which declared this common law rule to be
held unconstitutional, and that they were not really being deprived of
any rights because they had no right to commit this public nuisance
prior to the enactment of the statute. Thus it would seem, the court
thought, that the state Act simply prohibited certain action which
the common law maxim already prohibited.
It is submitted, however, that an analysis of these cases and the
logical result to which this use of the maxim leads is that the maxim
is really, by implication, a leash or limitation on the state police
power. In the first place, in those cases in which the maxim is used
the court is influenced by its belief that the acts which are being
forbidden or regulated are injurious to another person or corporation,
or to the public, and the maxim is interpreted as forbidding such in-
juries. Furthermore, the very fact that the court has frequently
stated in the cases discussed above that the maxim is at the basis of
68See also People v. New York Carbonic Acid Gas Co., 196 N. Y. 421, 436, 440
(1909).
69For an interesting analysis of the meaning of the maxim see Mahon v. Brown,
13 Wend. 261, 263, 264, 265 (N. Y. 1835).
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the police power and that that power of the state legislatures is a
means of giving efficacy to the maxim implies that a statute would
not be a valid exercise of the police power unless it could be shown
that the acts which the statute regulated or prohibited could also be
held to be regulated or prohibited by the maxim. The implication is
that the police power cannot be extended to any statutory regulation
to which the maxim cannot be applied by the court.7 0
The police power is broad and in its exercise the rights of the indi-
vidual or the corporation may be curtailed. Consequently, the court
thought that this power ought to be kept within bounds and it felt
the need of an instrument whereby it could control this power of the
state legislatures. The case of Munn v. Illinois,7 1 shows this well. That
case brought about a great expansion of the police power and, while
the example of the Sovereignty of the English Parliament influenced
the court greatly, yet it was reluctant to recognize an unlimited power
in the state legislatures. At this time, the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment had not yet been developed as a limitation on
the state police power. That the court felt the need of a check, however,
and viewed the maxim as satisfying this need, seems clear. Since that
time, the due process clause has been developed into an effective con-
stitutional check, and this is the principle reason why the court has
never expressly used the maxim in that way. Thus, this common law
maxim has served as an instrument for supporting the validity of
police measures and for defining the nature and scope of the state
police power. At the same time, the very way in which the maxim has
been used implies that it is also an instrument of control and, as
such, it is one which the court may use with considerable latitude be-
cause of its indefiniteness and variability of content.
Thus has the maxim grown and developed.7 2 Originally applied only
to those cases where the defendant had been doing something on his
own property which the common law courts held was injurious to the
property of others, it was ultimately used by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the exercise of its right of review over the police
power of the states. Throughout this long period of development, it
7OSee 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. by Carrington, 1927)
1241, where this is recognized in a more limited way.
7lSupra note 49.
72Perhaps the most unprecedented and extended use of the maxim is that made
by Pinkney in argument for the plaintiff in error in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat.
264, 374 (1820): "Nobody objects to a state enforcing its own penal laws; all that
is claimed is, that in executing them, it should not violate laws of the Union, which
are paramount. Sic utere luo ut alienum non laedas." The court, however, made no
mention of the maxim in its opinion and it has never been used in this way.
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appears to be more a principle of legislation than a rule of law. It can
hardly be said that there was a rule of law limiting one's use of his
own property because of the effect that use would have on the prop-
erty of another.- It was rather a principle of justice or policy under the
guise of which the courts, treating it as if it were a rule of law, have
enunciated rules of law for application in the cases which have come
before them, and, as such, it represents more accurately a guiding
principle of legislation.73 As a guide for the enunciation and applica-
tion of more detailed rules of law, the courts tried to approximate it in
the cases which have come before them. Thus, whenever the courts
held certain uses of property to come under the ban of the maxim,
they were laying down rules of law for those particular cases, which
rules, in many instances, were followed in later cases by virtue of the
doctrine of stare decisis. Likewise, the extension of the meaning of the
maxim to make it include more than it had included in the past, or
the restriction of its content by withdrawing from the scope of its
application situations in which it had previously governed, are ex-
amples of legislation by the courts. In this connection, it is extremely
interesting and significant that the United States Supreme Court
turned a maxim, legislative in character, into an instrument with
which to limit legislative power while at the same time broadening
the scope of its application and creating additional rules of law under
the guise of using it as a rule of law in itself.
This interpretation of the character of the maxim, it is submitted,
would eliminate that criticism most often directed at it, namely, that
it is meaningless because it decides nothing.7 4 This criticism would be
pertinent if the maxim were considered as a rule of law, but if it is
interpreted as being essentially a goal which the law should strive to
attain, the criticism loses is significance. These objections, then, do not
apply-that the court must first determine what is injurious 5 and
whether the actions involved in a particular case before it are of such
a character, and that to use the maxim even then is superfluoui be-
73TERRY, SOME LEADING PRINCIPLES OF ANGLo-AMiERICAN LAW, (1884) §§ Io,
II. See also I COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 70, 124: "Those beneficent maxims of
the common law which guard person and property have grown and expanded
until they mean vastly more to us than they did to our ancestors, and are more
minute, particular, and pervading in their protections; and we may confidently
look forward in the future to still further modifications in the direction of im-
provement."
74See Jeremiah Smith, The Use of Maxims in Jurisprudence (1895) 9 HARv. L.
REV. 13, 14-17. See also Lasala v. Holbrook, 4 Paige 169, 171 (N. Y. 1833);
O'Day v. Shouvlin, 136 N. E. 289, 291 (Ohio 1922); Erle, C. J., in Brand v.
Hammersmith & City Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 246 (1867).
75Compare the maxim Damnum absgue injuria.
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cause the term "injury" has the legal significance of that which the
law forbids, so that the case must be decided before the maxim can be
brought into it. As a goal for the law, it is not necessary for the maxim
to decide anything. The fact that it does not indicates that it is not a
rule of law rather than that it is meaningless. The fact that the
courts have treated it as if it were a rule of law does not make it one.
